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Latin America has been strongly affected by the international crisis and recession since late 
2008. In comparison to historical experience, how has Latin America coped with the global 
crisis, which has been the role of different transmission mechanisms, and how have the 
region’s structural and policy conditions affected its sensitivity to foreign shocks? Moreover, 
what policies can protect the region better from world crises and shocks, and to which extent 
should it rely on a strategy of close trade and financial integration into a world economy 
punctuated by shocks and crises? This paper addresses the latter questions in three steps. 
First, by assessing empirically the sensitivity of growth in the region’s seven major 
economies during 1990-2009 to large number of structural and cyclical factors, based on 
high-frequency panel-data estimations. Second, by using the latter results to decompose the 
amplitude of GDP reductions in both recessions according to the individual and combined 
contribution of the different growth factors. Third, to derive the main implications of the 








The international economy is recovering from the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. While 
the origin of the crisis was at the heart of the world’s financial centers, the transmission 
mechanisms of the crisis have been different among regions and countries. The financial 
crisis in major industrial economies was only halted by massive financial support and rescue 
programs implemented, while the free fall of demand, output, and employment was only 
reversed by the combination of large-scale financial intervention and the most aggressive 
macroeconomic expansion recorded in history. All other economies where financial systems 
were not in crisis – industrial and developing alike – suffered from international contagion 
from the financial centers’ crisis and the industrial world’s recession through conventional 
financial and trade transmission channels. 
This global financial crisis has raised concerns in developing economies about their 
macroeconomic policy frameworks and their development strategies. Among the questions 
raised by the crisis are: which policies can protect them best from world crises and shocks?, 
what role does domestic demand play in shielding them from crises?, and to which extent 
should they rely on a strategy of close trade and financial integration into a world economy 
punctuated by shocks and crises?  
Latin America has been strongly affected by the international crisis and recession since late 
2008. In comparison to previous crises, how has Latin America coped with the global crisis, 
which has been the role of different transmission mechanisms, and how have the regions 
structural conditions affected the region’s sensitivity to foreign shocks?  
This paper addresses the latter issues by assessing the performance of growth in Latin 
America’s seven major economies during 1990-2009, using high-frequency panel-data 
estimations. The growth model (which encompasses long-term structural and short-term 
cyclical and policy determinants of growth) identifies the main channels of transmission of 
foreign shocks (trade and financial, quantity and price channels) and possible interactions 
between foreign shocks and domestic structural conditions (including measures of external 
trade and financial openness), and allowing for structural changes observed within the 
sample period. 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Mona Haddad, Sebastian Sáez, Luis Ernesto Derbez, and conference 
participants for very useful comments and discussion. We also thank Ricardo González for 
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Then the estimation results are used to decompose growth into long-term and cyclical 
determinants to explain the amplitude of GDP decline during the 1998-99 Asian crisis and 
the 2008-09 global crisis. This allows to quantify and identify: (i) the differences in 
unconditional and conditional effects of the global crisis for LAC between both crises, (ii) the 
role of structural and policy variables that have improved the region’s resilience to foreign 
shocks and crises, and (iii) the main implications for the evaluation of the dominant 
development strategy adopted by the region since the 1990s. 
Section 2 of the paper describes the growth performance of Latin America during 1990-2009 
and justifies the focus on the two regional recessions: the 1998-99 recession associated to 
the Asian crisis and the 2008-09 recession caused by the global financial crisis. Section 3 
discusses the growth model and the choice of short and long-term growth factors and their 
relation to previous literature. Section 4 reports and discusses panel-data estimation results 
for the region’s growth performance. Section 5 uses the latter results to decompose the 
amplitude of both recessions, comparing the very different roles of external and domestic 
growth factors in both recessions. Section 6 draws the implications of the previous results for 
the choice of policy regimes and development strategies in support of the region’s growth 
and resilience to foreign shocks and crises. Final remarks close the paper. 
 
2. Latin America’s growth performance 
 
 
This study focuses on Latin America’s seven largest economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela – that account jointly for 91% of Latin America’s 
2008 GDP. The time sample spans the quarters ranging from 1990q1 through 2009q4. The 
main variable of interest is the countries’ annualized quarterly growth rate of seasonally-
adjusted real GDP. GDP data are from National Accounts and follow standard conventions 
and are seasonally adjusted.  
Figure 1 and 2A-2C depict quarterly GDP growth rates for the region and the seven 
individual countries, respectively.
2 Figure 1 reflects 4 periods of at least two consecutive 
quarters of negative average growth in the seven countries that represent the LAC region in 
our study: 1998q3 – 1992q2, 2001q3 – 2002q1, 2002q4 – 2003q1, and 2008q4 – 2009q1. 
The first episode is linked to the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and the last to the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis and world recession. The second and third episodes reflect two very deep but 
                                                 
2 Seasonally-adjusted GDP data are from official national sources. The full database used in this 
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idiosyncratic recessions in Argentina and Venezuela, more clearly visible in Figures 2A and 
2C. The two latter episodes were not caused by international but by domestic factors (a deep 
and generalized crisis in Argentina and a temporary collapse of oil production in Venezuela 
associated to a strike in the sector), with almost no consequences for other countries in the 
region. In contrast to the two latter country-specific episodes, 5 of the 7 countries suffered a 
recession during the 1998-99 regional contraction, and all 7 countries suffered a recession 
during the 2008-09 contraction. Hence we focus in this study on the two latter recessions 
only. 
Now let’s turn to date the precise extension of the recession. One possibility is to stick to the 
two windows of consecutive negative growth of the aggregate growth, depicted in Figure 1. 
However, this aggregate regional growth behavior may mask significant country 
heterogeneity that does not show in the regional average. Therefore we exploit the full panel-
data sample to test for recessions combining alternative recession windows for the 1998-99 
recession with different windows for the 2008-09 recession, using panel-data estimations.
3 
We find that the best results are those for the four-quarter window spanning 1998q3 – 
1999q2 (Asian Crisis) and the two-quarter window 2008q4 – 2009q1 (global financial crisis). 
The latter results are identical to the recession periods for aggregate LAC GDP, depicted in 
Figure 1. 
However, for the purpose of the final choice of contraction periods relevant for our growth 
decomposition analysis performed below, we also consider the behavior of output gaps 
around recessions (Figure 3).
4 The average output gap in LAC during the first recession 
period declines precisely during the 4-quarter window that was selected above, i.e., in 
1998q3-1999q2. The output gap starts to close in 1999q3, i.e., actual GDP growth exceeds 
estimated trend growth since the latter quarter. However, after the second recession period 
the output gap continues to widen in 2009q2 and 2009q3, reflecting a weak growth recovery 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This takes us to extend the contraction period 
relevant for our 1998-99 growth decomposition by one quarter, to obtain a three-quarter 
recession period. Accordingly, we have identified 1998q3-1999q2 (4 quarters) and 2008q4-
2009q2 (3 quarters) as the recession periods in this study. 
For the empirical analysis carried out below, the dependent variable is the annualized 
quarter-to-quarter rate of growth of seasonally-adjusted real GDP. The sources of our 
                                                 
3 Results are not reported here but available on request. 
4 In order to construct output gaps for each country, we use 2010-2014 GDP projections from 
Consensus Forecast. Then we use the 1990-2014 quarterly country time series for past and projected 
future GDP levels to estimate trend GDP series based on the Baxter-King filtering method. The output 
gap is defined as the percentage deviation of actual (or projected future) GDP from trend GDP. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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dependent and all other independent variables are national sources, ,the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Latin Macro Watch, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We refer the 
reader to Table 1 for a brief description of data sources and construction for the variables 
used in this paper. 
 
3. Growth Model 
 
 
The literature on long-term growth is very wide on both theoretical and empirical sides. While 
theoretical studies usually analyze the role of a key growth determinants in isolation, the 
empirical literature takes a wider view, considering several structural and policy growth 
factors. Our approach is to encompass the largest possible set of structural, institutional, 
policy, and cyclical determinants of short and long-term growth, anchored in theory and 
international evidence. Next we describe the variables selected for our growth specification 
and their relation to previous research and empirical findings. We group our variables in five 
major sets.    
20 years of empirical cross-country growth models have identified a large array of structural 
and policy variables that potentially matter for long-term growth – see, among others, Barro 
(1991), King and Levine (1993), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel 
(1997), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Dollar and Kraay (2002), Calderón, Fajnzylber and 
Loayza (2004), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), and Calderón, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2006). From the latter studies we have identified five potentially important drivers of long-
term growth. The first is a measure of domestic financial depth. We follow Levine, Loayza, 
and Beck (2000), among others, in using the ratio of private domestic credit supplied by 
private financial institutions to GDP as a proxy of financial depth. A deep and efficient capital 
market promotes long-run growth since it allows for better risk diversification by trading, 
pooling, and hedging financial instruments. A deep capital market is more likely to channel 
resources to profitable investment projects, as well as to reduce moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems that lead to inefficient resource allocation.
5 Next we include secondary 
school enrollment as a proxy for schooling and human capital investment, as by Barro (1991) 
                                                 
5 See Levine (2004) for a survey of theoretical foundations and firm-level, industry-level, and cross-
country empirical evidence pointing to the positive effect of financial development on long-term 
economic growth.  CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), among others. In the endogenous growth literature, 
the effects of human capital accumulation could counteract diminishing returns to physical 
capital, raising long-run growth. Furthermore, education and human capital supports 
technological innovation and eases technological adoption (see Borensztein, De Gregorio 
and Lee, 1995).
6  
Our third long-run growth variable is inflation as a measure of monetary stability and 
credibility, like in Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997), among many others. A sound 
monetary policy contributes, through low and predictable inflation, to a stable 
macroeconomic environment, which is beneficial for growth since it reduces uncertainty and 
hence encourages financial intermediation, efficient investment, and innovation. Next we 
introduce the fiscal balance ratio to GDP as a measure of fiscal soundness, sustainability, 
and credibility. A strong and sound fiscal framework is likely to promote growth by 
contributing to macroeconomic stability, too. Our final long-run growth factor is a measure of 
political certainty reflected by country risk. The latter index is an aggregate of institutional and 
political features – including political leadership, domestic and external conflict, government 
corruption, political tensions and terrorism – that impinge on growth through physical and 
human capital investment, as well as through productivity gains. 
Our next set is comprised by structural growth determinants that reflect development 
strategies vis-à-vis globalization and international integration. We start with two measures of 
international openness or global integration. Financial openness – proxied by the ratio of 
external assets and liabilities to GDP – is likely to spur economic growth because it may 
lower the cost of capital (therefore raising domestic investment) and increase international 
portfolio diversification (hence stabilizing aggregate demand and output, raising investment 
and innovation through higher macroeconomic stability). Trade openness raises growth since 
trade liberalization promotes resource allocation towards more productive sectors and firms, 
raising productivity. More trade is also likely to contribute to better diffusion of technical and 
organizational innovation through the interaction with foreign markets and firms. 
Now we turn to three structural variables related to a country’s external strength and 
resilience to foreign shocks, which are usually absent from the traditional literature on cross-
country growth empirics. One is a measure of a country’s external strength: its net external 
position reflected by the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. A stronger net 
                                                 
6 Recent literature has stressed the role of the quality of education as opposed to years of schooling a 
(i.e., Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008) as a long-term growth determinant. Once quality of education is 
considered (proxied by student test scores in literature, science or math), years of schooling is no 
longer a relevant growth determinant. However lack of systematic data for LAC on education quality 
leaves us no choice other than using educational attainment data. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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asset position reduces the likelihood of a domestic financial crisis when adverse foreign 
shocks hit, lessening the likelihood of deep output losses. The second variable is a measure 
of a country’s gross external liquidity position (a particular component of net foreign assets): 
the ratio of gross official reserves to GDP. A higher level of foreign liquidity provides a 
cushion against drops in capital inflows (IMF 2009a), limiting the real effects of sudden stops 
and thus reducing the likelihood of deep recessions. Our final structural growth determinant 
is the exchange rate regime, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a country has a 
flexible exchange-rate regime in place and zero otherwise.
7 
8 Exchange-rate flexibility 
provides a crucial shock absorber in the form of nominal (and real) exchange-rate adjustment 
when foreign shocks hit. Moreover, exchange-rate flexibility is the foundation for conducting 
expansionary counter-cyclical monetary policy when adverse foreign shocks hit, 
complementing the market-induced exchange-rate depreciation. This lessens 
macroeconomic volatility and, again, the likelihood of deep and protracted recessions. By 
contrast, countries under non-flexible exchange rate scheme (fixed or crawling pegs and 
exchange-rate bands) are prone to speculative attacks. Central banks attempt to defend 
against such attacks by using foreign reserves and adopting contractive monetary policies, 
deepening domestic recessions. 
Latin America records major improvements in net external balance sheets, foreign reserve 
levels, and non-reserve gross asset holdings during the 2000s (IADB 2008, IMF 2009b, 
Ocampo 2009, World Bank 2009, Jara, Moreno and Tovar, 2009). Latin America made good 
use of very favorable terms of trade and large capital inflows during 2003-2007. At the same 
time, many LAC countries have adopted flexible exchange-rate regimes since 1998-2000. 
The latter improvement in foreign positions and exchange-rate regimes implies a quantum 
shift from policy regimes and foreign positions that were in place in the region’s past 
experience, like when the Asian crisis hit. The literature on the short-term and cyclical 
behavior of aggregate output (or the output gap) is very wide, particularly on the empirical 
side. Every short-term macroeconomic model – including the DSGE models used in short-
term macroeconomic analysis and projections – includes a macroeconomic equation for 
short-term output, determined by supply and/or demand factors, including external conditions 
                                                 
7 Foreign reserves are unnecessary under a clean float and complete financial markets. Yet this 
textbook case is of little empirical relevance in a world punctuated by liquidity and solvency crises, 
sudden stops in the supply of foreign capital, and current account reversals. Hence countries may 
adopt a dirty float while at the same time they build up gross international reserves. Both price and 
quantity instruments are used as buffers to lessen the prospects of crises or, when they hit, to actively 
make use of them to cushion its effects. Therefore we include both the flexible exchange-rate regime 
and the level of international reserves as potential growth determinants.   
8 We use the IMF de facto classification of exchange rate regimes. Flexible exchange rate regimes 
allow for exchange-rate interventions or dirty floats. However, we consider two country departures 
from the IMF’s classification, described in Table 1. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  10
 
and domestic policy variables. By including short-term or cyclical growth determinants in our 
growth model for high-frequency (quarterly) data, omission bias is avoided. An additional 
reason for including short-term factors is that cyclical shocks and stabilization policies may 
not only affect cyclical fluctuations but also long-run growth. Fatás (2000a and 2000b) argues 
cyclical and trend growth are interrelated processes. 
Recent work has focused on the nature of the financial and trade shocks faced by LAC and 
other emerging-economy regions, as well as their policy response to the global financial 
crisis and the 2008-09 world recession, including Österholm and Zettelmeyer (2007), 
Caruana (2009), Jara, Moreno and Tovar (2009), IADB (2009a), IADB (2009b), IMF (2009a), 
IMF (2009b), Ocampo (2009), World Bank (2009), and Soto (2010). IMF (2009c) shows 
evidence that links financial crises to deep recessions that lead to persistent medium GDP. 
Our third set of growth determinants are five foreign cyclical variables that embody the 
transmission of foreign trade and financial shocks, considering both price and quantity 
shocks. All are defined in a way such that they are exogenous to countries in general and 
domestic growth in particular. On the trade side we include the growth rates of the terms of 
trade (a conventional factor in cross-country growth regressions), of GDP of trading partners 
(the weighted real GDP growth of countries engaged in trade with any given country), and of 
aggregate world exports. The price variable is a conventional regressor found in many cross-
country growth studies while the two quantity variables are infrequently used as growth 
determinants. However, we think that quantum drivers of external demand for domestic 
exports are potentially important determinants of cyclical growth. On the financial side we 
include a quantity and a price variable, which are also not found in long-term growth studies 
but sometimes in short-term projection models. The quantity variable is aggregate capital 
inflows to Latin America: higher inflows are likely to lead to higher short-term growth as 
foreign credit is eased and financial constraints on investment projects and durable 
consumption expenditures are lifted.
9 The price variable is sovereign debt spreads: when 
sovereign premiums rise, the cost of external financing increases, contracting domestic 
investment and growth. 
Our fourth set of growth determinants is comprised by two domestic macroeconomic policy 
variables, which play an important role in short-term macroeconomic models. Our fiscal 
policy measure is the ratio of government consumption to GDP). The latter variable is 
typically used as a proxy of government burden, affecting negatively growth because of the 
distorting effects of government taxes. This negative effect turns up in many empirical long-
                                                 
9 We use aggregate capital inflows to the region because capital inflows to individual countries are 
potentially endogenous to country growth. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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term growth models (e.g., Barro 1991, among may others). However, since we use high-
frequency data, government consumption can also capture a positive Keynesian aggregate-
demand impact on short-term growth. Hence the net empirical impact of government 
consumption on high-frequency growth is ambiguous.. Our monetary policy variable is the 
ex-ante short-term real interest rate, defined as the nominal monetary policy rate or short-
term interest rate adjusted by a measure of inflation expectations. A higher domestic short-
term real interest rate – caused by a hike in the nominal policy rate or a decline in inflation 
expectations – may raise medium-term real rates through the yield curve and have a 
negative effect on aggregated demand and short-term output. 
Our final set of regressors comprises a selective number of potentially relevant interaction 
effects between structural variables and foreign cyclical variables. Their inclusion is to take 
account of possible dampening or exacerbating role played by structural variables when 
foreign shocks hit, reflecting non-linearities in the behavior of growth. Following previous 
findings by Calderón, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), we include four interaction effects 
between foreign shocks and domestic structural variables. The first three interaction effects 
are between financial or trade openness, on one hand, and trading partners’ growth or LAC 
capital inflows, on the other hand. Their expected effects are a priori ambiguous. We include 
a fourth interaction, between net external assets and sovereign spreads. We expect the latter 
interaction to have a negative sign, as a higher level of net foreign assets (a lower level of 
net foreign liabilities) is likely to reduce the negative effect of higher foreign capital costs on 
growth. 
In sum, our reduced-form model for the short and long-term behavior of growth 
encompasses 21 potential growth factors grouped into 5 sets of variable categories. This 
model implies a significant departure from the previous literature by including a large variety 
and number of growth regressors, and considering both linear and interaction effects. In 
addition, we will test for within-sample changes in the growth model, allowing for structural 
changes in coefficient estimates. Our aim is to test for possible changes in growth behavior 
as a result of policy reforms adopted in LAC in the early 2000s, after the 1998-99 Asian 
crises and recession. The model specification is presented in the Appendix.  
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4. Growth Estimation Results for 1990-2009 
   
 
We estimate our growth model applying the fixed-effects panel-data estimator to an 
unbalanced set of 462 country-quarter observations. The main regression results are 
reported in Table 2 in stages, going from simple to more complex specifications. Column (1) 
presents the results without inclusion of interaction effects and without considering structural 
changes in coefficients. Column (2) reports the results with interaction effects between 
foreign cyclical variables and structural variables. Finally, column (3) reports the full results 
that combine interaction effects and structural changes in coefficients that have been 
observed since 2000-2003.  The first sub-column in (3) reports the coefficients estimated for 
the full sample period  and the second sub-column reports the coefficient changes observed 
after structural breaks in 2000-2003.
10 Therefore the sum of coefficients in both sub-columns 
represents the coefficient valid since the variable-specific quarter of structural through the 
end of the sample period (2009q4). 
Estimation results are satisfactory, as reflected by the overall fit of the regressions (we 
explain two thirds of the variation of high-frequency GDP in a panel sample of shock-prone 
Latin American countries) and the sign and significance of individual parameter estimates. 
Most parameter estimates are quite robust to different specifications reported in columns 1-3. 
We review briefly our main results. The lagged dependent variable is systematically not 
significant, which is probably due to the inclusion of a large number of growth determinants.
11   
Long-term growth determinants exhibit correct signs and most are statistically highly 
significant. Domestic financial depth (proxied by the private credit ratio to GDP), monetary 
stability (reflected by the negative of inflation), secondary school enrollment, the fiscal 
balance ratio to GDP (a measure of fiscal soundness and credibility), and political credibility 
have contributed significantly to GDP growth in LAC during 1990-2009. Most sample 
                                                 
10 Column (3) reports the final results of a grid search conducted over a large number of results with 
alternative combinations of different dates of structural change for different variables. The precise 
quarters at which structural changes in coefficients take place are the following for the corresponding 
variable (the final date identified after a search over a range of dates is noted in parenthesis): inflation 
(2000q4), political certainty (2001q1), financial openness (2003q2), trade openness (2000q1), 
international reserves (2000q1), exchange rate regime (2001q1), sovereign spreads (2000q2), and 
real interest rate (2002q1).  Blank cells in the second sub-column reflect non-significant structural 
changes, which therefore are not reported. 
11 To control for possible bias stemming from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, which 
could be correlated to the error term, we have run alternative regressions (available on request) where 
we have instrumented the lagged dependent variables using lags of independent variables. The 
results, both for the lagged dependent variable and the independent regressors, were unchanged. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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countries achieved large improvements in macroeconomic stability over the last two 
decades. Fiscal adjustment and public sector reforms have been reflected in lower public 
sector deficit and debt levels, while the adoption of new monetary regimes (in particular, 
inflation targeting) and more orthodox monetary policies led to lower and more stable levels 
of inflation. The contribution of macroeconomic stabilization to growth is reflected by the 
large and significant coefficients of the fiscal balance ratio to GDP and of inflation.  
The economic significance of two (out of five) long-term variables – that is, their parameter 
size – has diminished in the early 2000s. Inflation had a coefficient of -0.28 before 2001, 
which fell to -0.07 thereafter  –  a likely result of most Latin American countries achieving 
lower and more predictable levels of inflation, compared to their high-inflation past in the 
1990s and before. For similar reasons, the coefficient associated to political certainty has 
declined from 0.38 before 2001 to 0.32 afterwards.  
In addition to macroeconomic stabilization, LAC policy makers have intensified their 
countries’ integration into the world economy and, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, at 
strengthening their net and gross external positions, as well as adopting a more flexible 
exchange-rate regime. We have grouped the latter variables in our second set of growth 
determinants, our five structural variables. Both financial and trade openness contribute 
significantly to growth but their influence has changed in the early 2000s. While the role of 
financial openness to growth has lessened since 2003, the importance of trade openness 
has increased since 2000. The countries’ net foreign position – reflected by the net external 
asset ratio to GDP – is either significant on its own (column 1) or in interaction with sovereign 
spreads (column 2) but is not significant when considering structural changes in the early 
2000s(column 3).  
Building up foreign liquidity in the form of international reserves has been a policy goal in 
many countries after the Asian crisis, including those that have adopted dirty floats. 
International reserves made a large contribution to growth before 2000, when they were 
relatively scarce (with a coefficient of 0.83), which diminished sharply afterwards when 
reserves were built up (reflected by a much smaller coefficient of 0.26). The exchange-rate 
regime dummy for a float is not significant before 2001, when most Latin American 
economies had non-flexible exchange-rate regimes in place. However, afterwards a flexible 
exchange-rate regime (encompassing dirty floats like in Peru, clean floats like in Mexico, and 
alternating dirty-clean floats like in Chile, since 2000) has a significant role in raising growth 
in the region. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  14
 
Now let’s turn to our third class of growth factors: foreign cyclical variables. We measure the 
contribution of five external cyclical drivers of short-term growth in open economies. On the 
trade side, the price variable, i.e., terms-of-trade growth, displays the correct sign but is not a 
statistically significant GDP growth factor. On the quantity side, trading partners’ growth is 
not robustly significant either, but world export volume growth is a very significant growth 
determinant. On the financial side, the quantity variable, i.e., aggregate capital inflows to 
LAC, is a very significant growth factor. Finally, the cost of foreign borrowing, reflected by 
one of its major components, the sovereign spread, affects growth negatively but its effect is 
not statistically significant. 
Our fourth set of growth factors is comprised by two domestic policy variables. As discussed 
above, government consumption has a negative effect on long-term growth and a positive 
expansionary effect on short-term growth. Its positive and very significant sign reported in 
Table 3 suggests that the latter short-term effect dominates in Latin America. Our second 
policy variable is the short-term real interest rate, which exhibits a significant negative effect 
on growth. However, monetary policy is more contractive before 2002 (with a coefficient of -
0.33) than afterwards (when its coefficient declines to -0.04). The reduction in the impact of 
monetary policy on output growth in recent years may reflect the larger financial integration 
into the world economy attained during the past decade.      
Finally we turn to our four interaction effects between structural variables and foreign cyclical 
variables. The interaction effect on growth between trade openness and trading partners is 
negative but not robustly significant, while the interaction effect on growth between financial 
openness and trading partners’ growth is negative and not robustly significant. We did not 
have strong priors about the sign and significance of the latter interaction effects but we note 
that e estimated coefficient signs and significance levels are exactly opposite to those found 
for the world economy by Calderón, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) in long-term growth 
regressions. Our third interaction is between financial openness and capital inflows ton the 
region, which is negative and not robustly significant either. Finally, we find evidence for a 
positive and significant growth effect of the interaction between sovereign spreads and net 
external assets. As expected, this finding shows that the negative direct effect of higher 
sovereign spreads is dampened by a larger positive ratio of net foreign assets to GDP and 
exacerbated by a larger negative ratio.  
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Now we put our regression results to work by using them to explain the amplitude of LAC’s 
GDP growth decline in the aftermath of both crises. To start, we compute the amplitude of 
the growth reduction in the seven sample countries during both recessions, i.e., the 
cumulative GDP level reduction (expressed in annualized terms) observed between the peak 
quarter before the recession (labeled in Figure 4 as quarter 0) and the trough quarter of our 
selected recession periods (labeled in Figure 4 as quarter 4 or 1999q2 for the first recession 
and quarter 3 or 2009q2 for the second recession). Table 3 reports the annualized recession 
amplitude for the seven individual countries and the region at large. The peak-to-through 
cumulative GDP change ranges from a GDP loss of 8.5% in Venezuela to a GDP gain of 
3.4% in Mexico during the four-quarter 1998-99 recession. In contrast to the latter, the full 
country range is in negative terrain during the three-quarter 2008-09 recession, with 
cumulative GDP losses that range from 0.9% in Colombia to 11.1% in Mexico. 
Simple (weighted) country averages of recession amplitudes for the region stand at -3.0% (-
1.2%) for the first recession and -4.2% (-5.2%) for the second recession. By any of the latter 
measures, it is clear that the second recession was much deeper than the first one. Our next 
task is to explain a significant part of the observed simple-average recession amplitude, 
making use of our coefficient estimates and the changes in independent variables (and in 
coefficient estimates, when applicable), according to our decomposition method, summarized 
in the Appendix. 
The results are reported in Table 4, based on our most comprehensive regression results, 
those shown in column (3) of Table 2. There we report the recession amplitude 
decomposition for the Asian crisis (column 1) and for the global financial crisis (column 2). 
The latter column is divided into three sub-columns: the first is based on changes in 
explanatory variables only, the second is based on changes in estimated parameters only, 
and the third is the total contribution which is the sum of the two previous sub-columns. 
The amplitude of the first recession is -3.0% (reported in the bottom line of Table 5), of which 
we explain some 90%, i.e., an annualized output decline of 2.7%. Of the much deeper 
second recession, with an amplitude of -4.2%, we explain some 95%, i.e., an annualized 
output decline of 4.1%. Which are the factors driving these results? CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  16
 
Let’s start with foreign cyclical variables, which reflect the transmission mechanisms from 
international crises and recessions to the region. A striking difference emerges between 
LAC’s first and second recessions. On average (across countries and across the five foreign 
cyclical variables), international conditions improved during the first recession, contributing 
by 0.5% to higher cumulative growth.
12 The opposite is observed during the recent recession, 
when international conditions deteriorated on average massively for LAC, contributing by -
2.7% to (or more than half of) the recession’s amplitude. In 1998-99 three out of five foreign 
variables improved for LAC. However, in 2008-09 all five cyclical variables deteriorated, and 
the largest single external driver of the recession was the massive decline in trading partner’s 
growth.  Hence the 1998-99 was largely home-made, while the 2008-09 recession was 
significantly caused by the global financial crisis and world recession. 
Now let’s turn to long-term growth variables. They deteriorated on average significantly 
during the first recession, explaining a sizeable -1.7%, which is more than half of the 1998-99 
recession’s amplitude. In contrast, long-term variables improved on average during the 
second recession, contributing with 0.8% to higher cumulative growth in 2008-09. Higher 
private credit flows (relative to GDP) and lower inflation contributed most to positive growth, 
while the deterioration in fiscal balances (relative to GDP) weakened growth. When 
considering the reduced inflation coefficient observed since 2002, the growth gain from lower 
inflation is much smaller in 2008-09. Therefore, combining both changes in variables and 
coefficients, the contribution of long-term variables to the second recession’s amplitude is 
close to nil. 
We come to similar conclusions regarding the very different role of changes in structural 
variables during both recessions: they deepen the recession in 1998-99 (by -0.6%) while 
they dampen the recession in 2008-09 (by 0.6%). While our ex-post measures of financial 
and trade openness decline significantly during the most recent recession, the build-up of 
international reserves more than offsets the latter.  However, once we consider the large 
changes in coefficients after 2000 (smaller for financial openness, larger for trade openness, 
and smaller for international reserves), the overall contribution of structural variables to the 
2008-09 recession amplitude  – combining changes in their values and their estimated 
parameters – is very negative and equals -1.7%. 
Domestic macroeconomic policy played on average a contractive role in 1998-99 and an 
expansionary role in 2008-09. Fiscal policy was expansionary in both recessions, but much 
more so in the second experience, when it made a positive contribution by 1.1% to 
                                                 
12 For simplicity we use the term percent change instead of the more precise percentage-point change 
throughout this section.  CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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cumulative growth. As opposed to the latter, monetary policy was highly contractive in both 
recessions (due to higher nominal interest rates in 1998-99, and negative inflation 
expectations in 2008-09), but much less so in the recent experience. Higher real interest 
rates deepened the 1998-99 recession by 1.0%, while higher real rates (combined with the 
decline in the real interest rate absolute coefficient) deepened the 2008-09 recession just by 
0.1%. 
Finally, the growth effects of interactions between structural conditions and foreign shocks 
were neutral to the first recession but deepened significantly the second recession, by 0.7%. 
This is not surprising because the interaction terms largely reflect the amplifying effects of 
the deterioration in foreign conditions observed in 2008-09 but not in 1998-99. 
  




The evidence presented in this paper on Latin America’s performance during its two last 
crises, 1998-99 and 2008-09, shows striking differences between the very different role 
played by foreign and domestic growth factors in both recessions. The first (less intense) 
recession was largely homemade, while the second (more intense) recession was largely 
due to a deteriorating world economy. The combined effect of foreign cyclical factors was 
positive for Latin America’s growth during the first recession, while all foreign cyclical 
variables deteriorated sharply during the world financial crisis, explaining more than half of 
the last recession.  In contrast to foreign variables, all domestic variables explain more than 
100% of the first recession and less than half of the 2008-09 downturn.  
The latter result is due to the large changes in development strategies and policy regimes 
that Latin America started in the 1990s and deepened in the 2000s. While populist policies 
have reemerged in some countries, the region’s dominant development approach relies on 
market and private-sector development, strong commitment to global integration, adoption of 
sustainable macroeconomic and financial regimes, and some reform progress to make 
governments more effective in their provision of public goods. Next we derive the 
implications of our empirical findings for evaluating the region’s development strategy in 
three key areas: macroeconomic regimes and policies, domestic financial development, and 
international integration of goods and financial markets. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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Latin America started a major revamping of its macroeconomic policy frameworks in the 
1990s, a drive that was consolidated in the 2000s. Fiscal policy had been unsustainable in 
many countries since the 1970s and through the early 1990s, that led to fiscal crises and 
hyperinflation. Fiscal orthodoxy replaced profligacy in the 1990s, a trend that was intensified 
in the 2000s, when a significant part of commodity windfalls was saved. In turn, fiscal policy 
was used as a counter-cyclical stabilizing tool during the 2008-09 recession. 
Fiscal trend deficits were dramatically curtailed or turned into surpluses, and public debt 
levels were generally reduced to low and sustainable levels. Average public and publicly 
guaranteed debt fell from 30.1% of GDP in the early 1990s to 14.3% of GDP in the late 
2000s (Table 5). A final step toward further strengthening of fiscal frameworks in the region – 
adopting formal fiscal rules and fiscal councils – is still pending. Chile is the only country that 
has in place a fiscal rule since 2001. 
Our results provide strong evidence on the growth impact of the latter shift in the region’s 
fiscal policy. First, the fiscal balance makes a robust and economically large contribution to 
growth. Second, government consumption has a significant stabilizing effect on short-term 
growth. Our growth decomposition shows that the stabilizing role of government consumption 
was more heavily used during the 2008-09 contraction, when countries had more room for 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
The second regime change in macroeconomic policies was the shift from inflexible toward 
flexible exchange-rate regimes, largely implemented after the Asian crisis. Either forced by 
markets or as a result of policymakers’ conviction, many countries replaced their crawling 
pegs or exchange-rate bands by floats, which exceptionally are of the clean type (like in 
Mexico) and more frequently of the dirty type, i.e., with high-frequency non-announced 
interventions (like in Brazil or Peru) or low-frequency pre-announced intervention periods 
(like in Chile). Latin America has reaped three benefits from flexible exchange rates: 
avoidance of recurring currency crises (that often lead to recessions), use of nominal (and 
hence real) exchange-rate adjustment as a buffer against adverse foreign shocks (therefore 
avoiding costly unemployment and output losses), and allowing full conduct of an 
independent monetary policy.  
Flexible exchange rates have not precluded countries from engaging in trend accumulation 
of international reserves to strengthen their foreign liquidity positions. Drawing lessons from 
recurring past experience with inflexible exchange-rate regimes and currency crises, Latin 
America has adopted an eclectic framework that combines exchange-rate flexibility with self-
insurance in the form of holding significant levels of international reserves. Our empirical CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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evidence shows that both a flexible exchange-rate regime and foreign exchange holdings 
contribute to growth in Latin America. Most revealing is our finding that while reserve 
holdings had a very large effect and the exchange-rate regime a non-significant effect on 
growth in the 1990s, the relative importance of both variables was reversed after the shift 
toward floats. Since 2000-01, the flexible exchange rate regime has a significant and large 
effect on growth, while the effect of reserve holdings has declined in size albeit not in 
statistical significance. Moreover, during the 1998-99 recession, central banks sold reserves 
and therefore contributed to deepen the recession, while in 2008-09 they did the opposite, 
contributing to higher growth. 
The third component of macroeconomic policies is the monetary regime. As noted above, a 
flexible exchange rate is a necessary condition for exercising an independent monetary 
policy. Fiscal sustainability and responsibility precludes fiscal dominance over monetary 
policy, which is a second macroeconomic regime condition for the exercise of an 
independent and credible monetary policy. Finally, de jure (or, at least, de facto) central bank 
independence strengthens the conduct of a monetary policy that is independent of direct 
interference by government or private-sector interests. Adoption of inflation targeting, today’s 
monetary regime of choice among many central banks in the world, requires the three latter 
conditions to be satisfied. Therefore it is no coincidence that several central banks adopted 
inflation targeting in Latin America after obtaining legal or de facto independence, after 
severing their links with government budgets, and during or after their transition toward 
floating exchange rates. With inflation targeting (and sometimes without it), central banks 
have made significant progress in adopting a framework of careful and responsible exercise 
in monetary policy. The success of monetary policy is reflected in low inflation, which has 
declined in Latin America from an annual average of 34% in the early 1990s to 7% in the last 
five years (Table 6). Our findings support the conclusion that lower inflation contributes 
significantly to higher growth. 
The gains in monetary policy credibility reaped from low inflation allow gradually central 
banks to adopt counter-cyclical monetary policies. While central banks were busy defending 
their inflexible exchange-rates during the 1998-99 recession, they allowed their local 
currencies to depreciate in 2008-09 and exercised counter-cyclical monetary policies. Our 
evidence shows that central banks raised nominal (and hence real) interest rates in 1998-99, 
while they cut nominal interest rates in 2008-09. Although the latter cuts were not sufficient to 
compensate for a significant decline in inflation expectations, they helped in avoiding 
excessively high real interest rates. Our evidence shows that growth was significantly 
curtailed by contractive monetary policy in 1998-99, as opposed to the 2008-09 experience. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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The macroeconomic regime shifts that Latin America has implemented in the last decade 
have contributed to hold aggregate demand growth in check during the last decade, leading 
to healthy current account balances and significant reduction in public and private net 
external liabilities. Our findings confirm that the build-up of net external assets has had a 
significant positive effect on the region’s growth performance, either directly or interacting 
with sovereign debt premiums. Moreover, when the global financial crisis and world 
recession of 2008-09 hit, Latin America’s fiscal and external position was healthy and policy 
regimes were strong, enabling the region to face very well – compared to 1998-99 or 1981-
82 – the severe deterioration in international conditions, adopting effective counter-cyclical 
policies for the first time in its recorded history.  
The second area of significant progress in the region has been in the development of 
domestic financial and capital markets. During the last decade Latin America’s banking 
sector has developed both in size and diversity of financial services, while improving its 
health and resilience to domestic and external shocks. Domestic financial deepening (and 
financial integration) has been facilitated by macroeconomic stability, deregulation of 
domestic financial activities, privatization of banks, opening up to foreign ownership of banks, 
privatization of non-financial firms, and reduction of controls on foreign capital flows. 
Restrained from excessive risk taking by reformed financial regulation and supervision – that 
reflects the right lessons derived from previous financial crises – the region’s banks have 
avoided exposure to U.S. toxic assets and have generally resisted well the recession of 
1998-99. In fact, no financial crises were observed during 1998-99 in a region that HAD 
suffered Recurring banking crises in the past, when hit by severe foreign shocks and 
domestic recessions. In our findings, the ratio to GDP of private credit from commercial 
banks contributes significantly to the region’s growth. Moreover, the increase in the latter 
ratio had a mild stabilizing effect during the 1998-99 recession and a largeR expansionary 
influence during the 2008-09 recession. 
Beyond banking, the region adopted capital-market reforms that boosted the development of 
private debt and equity markets, insurance markets, and pension funds. Financial and 
capital-market development is a major and robust growth determinant acting through several 
channels of transmission on saving and investment, and, fundamentally, on productivity 
growth, as shown by a long literature (e.g., Levine 2005). Deep pension reforms in many 
Latin American countries have replaced state-run pay-as-you-go pension systems by 
defined-contribution systems managed by private companies that invest pension funds both 
domestically and internationally. The latter systems contribute to financial deepening (and 
financial opening), improve domestic corporate governance, and raise aggregate efficiency. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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Hence structural pension reform can contribute significantly to economic growth, as shown in 
the Chilean case (Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003). 
The third key area of the region’s development strategy is globalization. Latin America in 
general has deepened its trade and financial integration with the world economy. During the 
past two decades, the region has largely dismantled its massive historical barriers to trade in 
goods, services, and capital flows.  
Latin American countries have made much progress in reducing import tariffs, eliminating 
most non-tariff barriers, and putting in place a large number of multilateral and bilateral 
preferential trade agreements with major world trading partners. An open trade regime 
contributes to higher long-term growth by reaping the well-known benefits of improved 
resource allocation and helps to cushion the negative growth effects of adverse regional 
shocks (such as the 2008-09 recession in industrial countries) through a regionally more 
diversified trade pattern. The region’s large progress in trade integration is reflected by an 
increase in its average total trade ratio to GDP from 32% in the early 1990s to 49% in the 
late 2000s (Table 7).  The countries that have progressed most in trade integration are Chile 
and Mexico – a result of their low general trade barriers and having a dominant share of their 
foreign trade conducted under preferential trade agreements. According to our findings, 
higher trade openness has a very significant and large effect on the region’s growth 
performance. The drawback of this positive impact on long-term growth is that during 
recessions, when trade declines more than domestic output, shrinking trade ratios deepen 
domestic recessions – this was observed moderately in 1998-99 and massively in 2008-09, 
according to our results. 
Regarding financial integration, Latin America has complemented domestic financial 
liberalization with external financial opening, reducing restrictions on holdings, inflows and 
outflows of short and long-term foreign direct investment, loans, and portfolio and equity 
flows. Restrictions on short-term capital inflows – prevalent in some countries during the 
1990s – have been abolished and/or not restarted in most countries. International financial 
integration leads to larger gross external asset and liability holdings, which contribute to a 
more efficient allocation of resources and better insurance against national idiosyncratic 
shocks, and hence to higher growth and lower income and output volatility. The region’s 
progress in financial integration is reflected by a rise of the average total external asset and 
liability ratio to GDP from 89% in the early 1990s to 114% in the late 2000s (Table 8). We 
have also found that higher financial openness has a very significant and large effect on the 
region’s growth performance. However, while during the 1998-99 recession the GDP ratio of 
external asset and liability holdings increased, hence lessening the recession, the opposite CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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occurred during 2008-09, when the significant decline of the latter ratio (reflecting in part the 
decline in capital inflows to the region) contributed to deepen the recession. 
Despite large progress in applying a coherent and sustainable development strategy, Latin 
America still faces a large pending agenda to raise growth further and to make faster 
progress in reducing poverty and improving income distribution. On growth the region’s main 
shortcoming is the low level of productivity and the inadequate rate of productivity growth. 
There is much room to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic markets and 
to facilitate the process of creative destruction. Labor markets are excessively regulated in 
the formal sector, leading to high structural unemployment and informal employment. 
Another area where the equity and efficiency costs of inadequate public policies are very 
high is in education, which exhibits very low quality levels. Although much progress has been 
made regarding school enrollment and educational attainment, Latin American countries still 
rank very low in international education achievement tests, even when controlling for their 
per capita income levels. Public education suffers from low budgets, poor incentives, lack of 
accountability, and barriers to education reforms aimed at improving teaching methods and 
raising teachers’ productivity. Finally, regional growth is hampered by wide-spread 
government corruption and low efficiency of public administration. Government bureaucrats 
are largely selected on the basis of party affiliation instead of professional merit, which is 
reflected not only in low quality of government bureaucracies but also their short tenure, 
linked to government mandates. Notable exceptions are Brazil and Chile, which have 
introduced, at least partly, meritocratic hiring of government managers and staff. Hence 
government reform at all levels – from municipalities to public enterprises and to central 
governments – is also a major development challenge in the region’s quest to attain higher 
growth and more equity. 
 




We conclude that Latin America has changed significantly between the late 1990s and the 
2000s. This paper’s empirical results show that the region’s growth rate has been raised by 
putting in place a better and stronger development strategy since the late 1990s. While there 
is still significant intra-regional heterogeneity in economic regimes and policies, the 
predominant development strategy is based on the adoption of prudent and rule-based 
macroeconomic policies, deeper and healthier financial systems and capital markets, and CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
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strong integration into world goods and capital markets. Our results show that improvements 
in many specific variables associated to these three areas have led to higher average 
growth. 
Moreover, Latin America’s resilience to adverse foreign shocks has been greatly improved by 
adopting the latter development strategy. This paper’s results show that the last recessions 
suffered by the region were very different – in magnitude, the role of foreign shocks, and the 
contribution of domestic conditions and policies. The 1998-99 recession – of a smaller 
magnitude – was largely homemade, related to the weak macroeconomic and structural 
policy framework that Latin America had in place in the 1990s. In contrast, the second 
recession – much deeper and affecting all major Latin American economies – was largely 
due to deteriorating conditions in the world economy. . The improved resilience of Latin 
America to foreign shocks and world recessions is reflected by our results in four ways. First, 
the success in adopting macroeconomic policy regimes that protect better domestic 
economies against external shocks (like exchange-rate floats, lower levels of foreign net 
liabilities, and larger levels of gross international reserves) and strengthen adoption of 
counter-cyclical policies (like inflation targeting, contributing to lower inflation, and improved 
fiscal policy frameworks, reflected in lower public debts and deficits). Second, the success in 
building up deeper and healthier financial systems and capital markets. Third, the attainment 
of larger trade and financial integration. Finally, the indirect benefits of the latter 
improvements in reducing the sensitivity of growth to adverse conditions, reflected for 
example by the post-2000 reduction in the sensitivity of growth (i.e., in growth coefficients) of 
inflation and political uncertainty, and the increase in the sensitivity of growth to trade 
openness and exchange-rate floats. 
Although much has changed in Latin America in the last two decades, there are still many 
impediments to achieve higher and sustained  growth and better opportunities for the poor. A 
large reform agenda to improve the region’s business environment, labor market regulations, 
quality of education, and government efficiency has to be tackled to raise Latin America’s 
efficiency and equity levels. Lack of progress in the latter areas could result in frustration with 
macroeconomic responsibility and structural achievements, creating conditions for further 
spreading of populist policies that inflicted so much damage to the region in the last fifty 
years. To make significant progress in these areas requires improving significantly the quality 
and independence of the public sector, learning from successful experience of countries like 
Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, or Sweden. 
 CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  24
 








Arellano, M. and B. Honoré (2001). “Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments.” 
Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, Chapter 53. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations.” The Review of Economic 
Studies 58, 277-297. 
Barro, R. J. (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 56(2): 407-43. 
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X., 2004, “Economic Growth,” McGraw-Hill, Second Edition. 
Baxter, M. and R. G. King (1999). "Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass 
Filters for Economic Time Series". The Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 575–
593. 
Borensztein, E., J. De Gregorio and J-W. Lee (1995). “How Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Affect Economic Growth?” Journal of International Economics 45, 1: 115-35. 
Calderón, C., P. Fajnzylber and N. Loayza (2004). “Economic Growth in Latin America and 
The Caribbean: Stylized Facts, Explanations, and Forecasts,” Working Papers Central 
Bank of Chile 265, Central Bank of Chile. 
Calderón, C., N. Loayza and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2006). “External Conditions and Growth 
Performance,” Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: 
Ricardo Caballero, César Calderón, Luis Felipe Céspedes, Norman Loayza (Series 
Editor), and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.), External Vulnerability and Preventive Policies, 
edition 1, volume 10, chapter 3, pages 41-70, Central Bank of Chile. 
Caruana, J. (2009): "Financial globalization, the crisis and Latin America", speech at the 
XLVI Meeting of Central Bank Governors of the American Continent and LXXXVII 
Meeting of Central Bank Governors of Latin America and Spain, Punta Cana, 
Dominican Republic, 14 May. 
V. Corbo and K. Schmidt-Hebbel: “Macroeconomic Effects of Pension Reform in Chile”, in 
FIAP: Pension Reforms: Results and Challenges. CIEDESS, Santiago, 2003. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  26
 
Dollar D. and A. Kraay (2002). “Growth is Good for the Poor.” Journal of Economic Growth 
7(3): 195-225. 
Easterly, W., N. Loayza, and P. Montiel (1997). “Has Latin America’s Post-Reform Growth 
Been Disappointing?,” Journal of International Economics 43, 287-311. 
Easterly. W. and S. Rebelo (1993). “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: an Empirical 
Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3): 417-58. 
Fatás, A. (2000a). “Endogenous Growth and Stochastic Trends.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 45, 107-128. 
Fatás, A. (2000b). “Do Business Cycles Cast Long Shadows? Short-run Persistence and 
Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 5, 147-162. 
Hanushek, E.A. and L. Wößmann (2008). “The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic 
Development”. Journal of Economic Literature 46(3): 607-668. 
Jara, A, R. Moreno and C. E. Tovar (2009), “The global crisis and Latin America: financial 
impact and policy responses”, BIS Quarterly Review, June. 
Inter-American Development Bank (2009a), “Policy Trade-offs for Unprecedented Times: 
Confronting the Global Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Washington, DC. 
Inter-American Development Bank (2009b), “Social and Labor Market Policies for 
Tumultuous Times: Confronting the Global Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 
Washington, DC. 
International Monetary Fund (2009a), “World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery”, 
Washington, DC, April. 
International Monetary Fund (2009b), “Regional Economic Outlook, Western Hemisphere: 
Crisis Averted – What’s Next?”, Washington, DC, October. 
International Monetary Fund (2009c), “World Economic Outlook”, Washington, DC, October. 
King, R. G. and R. Levine (1993). “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 717-37. 
Levine, R. (2005). “Finance and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Mechanisms”. In Handbook 
of Economic Growth, edited by P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Levine, R., N. Loayza, and T. Beck (2000). “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality 
and Causes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 46, No.1: 31-77. 
Mankiw, G., P. Romer, and D. Weil (1992). “ A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics May: 407-43. CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  27
 
Nickell, S. (1981). “Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects”. Econometrica 49, 1417–
1426. 
Ocampo, J. A. (2009), “Latin America and the global financial crisis”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 33, 703–724. 
Österholm, P. and J. Zettelmeyer (2007), “The Effect of External Conditions on Growth in 
Latin America,” IMF Working Paper 07/176, Washington, DC. 
Soto, R. (2010). “South America: Achieving Sustained Growth” in Peter A. Petri (editor) 
“Inclusive, Balanced, Sustained Growth in the Asia-Pacific”, Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, January. 
World Bank (2009), “The Global Financial and Economic Storm: How Bad is the Weather in 
Latin America and the Caribbean?”, Washington, DC. 
 






Method of Decomposition of Recession Amplitude 
 
The general specification of our growth model is the following:  
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where  Y is a vector of country-quarter growth observations, X is a matrix of long-term 
variables, K is a matrix of domestic policy variables, M is a matrix of structural variables, Z is 
a matrix of foreign cyclical variables, MZ is a matrix of interactions between structural and 
foreign cyclical variables, μ is a vector of individual country effects that reflect unobservable 
country heterogeneity, ε is a vector of error terms, and i and t are country and time indexes, 
respectively. The regression equation also allows for unobserved country-specific effects. 
We do not consider time-specific effects since they are perfectly correlated with common 
foreign shocks such as the capital inflows to Latin America and the growth rate of world 
exports. 
We estimate equation (1) using the fixed effects panel-data estimator, which is adequate for 
panels with a large number of time observations (up to 80 quarters, 1990-2009) and a small 
number of cross-section units (7 countries). We have controlled for a few extreme events 
reflected in very large outliers of the dependent variable, associated to massive idiosyncratic 
shocks, visible in Figures 2A and 2C: Argentina (2001q3-2002q1) and Venezuela (2002q4-
2003q2 and 2004q1). 
Our model is dynamic as it includes the lagged dependent variable. This may give rise to 
bias due to potential correlation with the error term. This problem is particularly acute in 
samples with small numbers of time observations, which is not our case.
13 Moreover, below 
we refer to alternative regression results based on IV estimation where we have 
instrumented the lagged dependent variable.  
Decomposition of the GDP decline or amplitude of the recession is based on equation (2), as 
reflected by the following equation: 
                                                 
13 In fact, Nickell (1981) derives an expression for the bias of the lagged dependent variable when 
there are no exogenous regressors, showing that the bias approaches zero as the time dimension 
approaches infinity. Therefore our estimation method should perform well, as it is applied to samples 
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Note that when we compare both crises, parameter estimates are allowed to exhibit 






) be the vector of 




be the estimated coefficient for the structural break, corresponding for the vector of 
regressors R. For the decomposition of the global financial crisis recession, the relation 
between the latter takes the following form:  
 






R β β β  
 
In Table 4, in  column “Structural Change – NO”, we report  t i, R ' ˆ Δ
Asian
R β , i.e., the contribution 
of the corresponding change in regressors during the global financial crisis evaluated at 
Asian crisis parameter values. In column “Structural Change – Change” we report 
t i, R ' ˆ Δ
Change
R β  and under the column of “Structural Change – YES” we report  t i, R ' ˆ Δ
Global
R β . 
                                                 
14 Note that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not present in the decomposition. This 
is because it is not significant. However, this is not an adequate reason to discard that term. The right 
procedure is to use the parameters obtained from estimating equation (2) imposing the hypothesis of 
ρ=0. Since, the parameters are virtually the same using both methods, we use the parameters 
reported in Table 3.  CASE Network Studies & Analyses No.429 – The International Crisis and Latin America… 
  30
 
Table 1. Determinants of Growth 
 
Variable Description  Source 
GDP Growth 
 
Quarterly growth rate of GDP in constant prices. Series are 
seasonally adjusted by official national sources 
Official national 
accounts of each 
country 




Secondary school enrollment, private (percentage of total 




π/(1 + π), where π is the annualized quarterly growth rate of the 




Government consumptionratio to GDP. Series are seasonally 
adjusted by official national sources 
 
Official national 








(Nominal interest rate - π)/(1 + π), where the nominal interest rate 
is the 90-day bank deposit rate (average per quarter, annualized) 




Four-quarter moving average of central government balance ratio 
to GDP. 





(Exports + imports)/GDP, where the three variables are defined 
in real terms. Series are seasonally adjusted by official national 
sources 
Official national 




(External Assets + External Liabilities)/GDP where the numerator 
is expressed in constant domestic currency using the nominal 





Gross international reserves of the monetary system as ratio to 
GDP 




IMF classification of exchange rate regimes with two modifications 
based on market interventions: (i) Argentina’s regime is classified 
as intermediate starting in 2004q3; (ii) Peru’s regime is classified as 
fixed during the 1991q4-2007q4 quarter. Variable takes three 





Terms of Trade 






Trade-weighted average of quarterly growth rates of trading 







Annualized growth rate of quarterly world exports  IFS 
Capital Inflows 
to the Region 
Gross capital inflows to the seven Latin American countries (LAC-
7) as ratio to LAC-7 GDP. Sum of FDI, portfolio debt and equity 





EMBI/(1+EMBI) where EMBI is the Emerging Market Bond 
Index (average per quarter) in absolute terms (as opposed to basis 
points). Series extended back to early1990s using predicted values 
of a regression of EMBI on ICRG’s Financial Risk Index. 
JP Morgan and 
ICRG 
Source: Own elaboration. Notes: IADB: Inter- American Development Bank,   ICRG: International Country Risk 
Guide, IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF: International Monetary Fund, and WDI: World Development 
Indicators. 
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Table 2. Growth Regression Results 
Estimation Method: Fixed-effects (within) regression
Dependent Variable: Growth of Real GDP
Time Sample: 1990:1-2009:4 (quarterly frecuency)




GDP Growth (lagged) 0.026 0.006 -0.020
(0.063) (0.056) (0.045)
Long-Term Variables
Private Credit 0.080** 0.068* 0.101**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Secondary School Enrollment 0.227* 0.123 0.328*
(0.132) (0.133) (0.167)
Inflation -0.169** -0.191** -0.278*** 0.210*
(0.078) (0.074) (0.098) (0.115)
Fiscal Balance 0.610*** 0.753*** 0.802***
(0.208) (0.213) (0.240)
Political Certainty 0.249** 0.292*** 0.377*** -0.055**
(0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.023)
Structural Variables
Financial Openness 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.087*** -0.020**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009)
Trade Openness 0.322*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.190***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.102) (0.056)
Net External Assets 0.081** 0.096*** 0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.041)
International Reserves 0.279*** 0.248*** 0.829*** -0.567***
(0.071) (0.078) (0.202) (0.194)
Exchange Rate Regime 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.027***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Foreign Cyclical Variables
Terms of Trade Growth 0.012 0.007 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Growth of Trading Partners 0.221* 0.215 0.224
(0.133) (0.138) (0.137)
Growth of World Exports 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Capital Inflows to Latin America 0.573** 0.475** 0.419*
(0.244) (0.239) (0.252)
Sovereign Spreads -0.040 -0.023 -0.039 -0.032
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.020)
Domestic Policy Variables
Government Consumption 1.386*** 1.362*** 1.516***
(0.328) (0.319) (0.304)
Real Interest Rate -0.168** -0.192*** -0.326*** 0.289**
(0.071) (0.068) (0.077) (0.119)
Interactions
Growth of Trading Partners * Trade Openness 1.170* 0.995
(0.657) (0.607)
Growth of Trading Partners * Financial Openness -0.629* -0.385
(0.332) (0.301)
Capital Inflows to Latin America * Financial Openness -1.232** -0.677
(0.603) (0.609)
Sovereign Spreads * Net External Assets 0.284** 0.377***
(0.125) (0.130)
Constant -0.288** -0.274** -0.497***
(0.122) (0.118) (0.139)
Observations 462 462 462
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Table 3. Recessions in Latin America 
       
  Amplitude of GDP Growth Decline 
  Asian Global  Financial 
  Crisis Crisis 
   1998q3-1999q2 2008q4-2009q2 
Argentina -5.20%  -1.55% 
Brazil -1.03%  -3.99% 
Chile -3.88%  -4.40% 
Colombia -6.82%  -0.87% 
Mexico 3.37%  -11.09% 
Peru 1.15%  -3.64% 
Venezuela -8.51%  -3.59% 
Simple Average  -2.99%  -4.16% 
Weighted Average  -1.15%  -5.24% 
    Source: Own elaboration. Notes: Cumulative GDP growth rates within the reference  
      period. Series de-seasonalized using ARIMA X-11. 
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Amplitude of GDP Growth Decline -2.99% -4.16%
NO Changes YES
Sources:
Long-Term Variables -1.68% 0.77% 0.05%
Private Credit 0.24% 0.44% 0.44%
Inflation 0.65% 0.97% -0.73% 0.24%
Secondary School Enrollment -0.14% 0.15% 0.15%
Fiscal Balance -1.17% -0.73% -0.73%
Political Certainty -1.26% -0.06% 0.01% -0.05%
Structural Variables -0.57% 0.59% -1.70%
Financial Openness 0.73% -0.60% 0.14% -0.46%
Trade Openness -0.53% -1.32% -0.79% -2.11%
Net External Assets -0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
International Reserves -0.68% 2.43% -1.64% 0.79%
Exchange Rate Regime -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Foreign Cyclical Variables 0.54% -2.60% -2.74%
Terms of Trade Growth 0.02% -0.32% -0.32%
Growth of Trading Partners 0.26% -1.36% -1.36%
Growth of World Exports 0.53% -0.05% -0.05%
Capital Inflows to Latin America -0.05% -0.68% -0.68%
Sovereign Spreads -0.22% -0.19% -0.14% -0.33%
Domestic Policy Variables -0.99% -0.14% 0.99%
Government Consumption 0.69% 1.12% 1.12%
Real Interest Rate -1.68% -1.26% 1.13% -0.13%
Interactions -0.02% -0.67% -0.67%
Growth of Trading Partners * Trade Openness 0.00% -0.19% -0.19%
Growth of Trading Partners * Financial Openness 0.10% -0.35% -0.35%
Capital Inflows to Latin America * Financial Openness -0.09% -0.10% -0.10%
Sovereign Spreads * Net External Assets -0.02% -0.03% -0.03%
Structural Changes post-2000 -2.02%
Explained Variation -2.72% -4.07% -4.07%
Unexplained Variation -0.26% -0.09% -0.09%
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Table 5. Public and Publicly Guaranteed 
External Debt in Latin America (% of GDP) 
              
   1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Argentina  23.59% 23.92% 56.35% 25.84% 
Brazil  20.31% 12.35% 16.91%  7.26% 
Chile  23.42%  7.16% 9.15% 6.27% 
Colombia  28.04% 17.05% 22.71% 14.10% 
Mexico  22.03% 24.06% 14.80% 10.93% 
Peru  45.23% 35.13% 36.18% 21.43% 
Venezuela  48.10% 34.11% 24.51% 14.41% 
Simple  Average  30.10% 21.97% 25.80% 14.32% 
Weighted  Average  23.56% 18.42% 22.51% 11.62% 
  Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2010). 
 
 
Table 6. Inflation in Latin America 
              
   1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Argentina  30.46%  0.21% 6.73% 8.26% 
Brazil  85.91%  8.56% 7.79% 4.54% 
Chile  13.66%  5.26% 2.68% 3.69% 
Colombia 20.02%  14.32%  6.55%  4.69% 
Mexico 12.32%  19.01%  5.40%  4.04% 
Peru  47.09%  7.08% 2.19% 2.54% 
Venezuela  30.12% 30.74% 16.75% 18.06% 
Simple Average  34.23%  12.17%  6.87%  6.55% 
Weighted Average  51.68%  11.16%  7.11%  5.45% 
  Source: Own elaboration 





Table 7. Trade Openness in Latin America 
              
   1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Argentina  17.20% 22.12% 22.60% 25.98% 
Brazil  15.45% 20.44% 22.36% 27.40% 
Chile  49.72% 60.85% 68.41% 83.56% 
Colombia  29.96% 37.50% 36.76% 44.27% 
Mexico  27.26% 40.47% 53.32% 60.89% 
Peru  26.00% 32.74% 35.43% 40.56% 
Venezuela  61.37% 56.22% 52.46% 61.29% 
Simple  Average  32.42% 38.62% 41.62% 49.14% 
Weighted  Average 22.64% 29.53% 33.74% 39.77% 
  Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
Table 8. Financial Openness in Latin America 
              
   1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Argentina  78.47%  103.80% 176.51% 147.57% 
Brazil  45.84% 53.18% 86.77% 82.94% 
Chile  119.02% 126.87% 192.10% 184.57% 
Colombia  51.70% 61.62% 87.07% 78.97% 
Mexico  62.99% 81.79% 70.28% 79.52% 
Peru  97.99%  100.91% 103.79% 102.45% 
Venezuela  156.85% 131.10% 145.50% 122.00% 
Simple Average  87.55%  94.18%  123.14%  114.00% 
Weighted  Average  63.19%  74.23% 100.77% 95.70% 
  Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 1. Average GDP Growth in Latin America 
 
  Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 2A. GDP Growth in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
 




Figure 2B. GDP Growth in Chile, Colombia and Peru 
 
  Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 2C. GDP Growth in Venezuela 
 




Figure 3. Average Output Gap in Latin America 
 
  Source: Own elaboration 
 
Figure 4. Average GDP Growth around Crises 
 
 
  Source: Own elaboration 